Ahora, lo importante

Bottom of the barrel

A Chinese oil firm buys an exploration outfit willing to drill almost anywhere


Controversy in the pipeline

MOST firms making an acquisition want, at the very least, to buy assets protected by strong legal systems in stable countries. But when it comes to buying natural resources, China’s large state-controlled enterprises have found themselves blocked in whole or part from countries offering precisely those virtues because of concerns about their own operating practices. As a result, China’s desperate hunt for energy to feed its vast industrial economy is focusing on trickier locations. On June 24th a subsidiary of the China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) announced plans to buy Addax Petroleum, a Swiss company which has listings in Toronto and London and drilling rights in Iraq, Gabon and Nigeria.

The deal is worth $9 billion including the assumption of debt. If it succeeds (it has already been accepted by Addax’s management), it will be the biggest takeover of a foreign firm by a Chinese one. Sinopec calls it “transformational”, but in reality it is merely the latest and largest of many similar deals. In December, for example, another Sinopec subsidiary spent $2 billion to acquire Tanganyika Oil, which, like Addax, trades on the Toronto Exchange. Tanganyika produces 23,000 barrels a day, one-sixth of Addax’s current production.

Before the Addax deal closes, Sinopec will need the approval of China’s government (almost certain, given its clout) and of Addax’s shareholders who, based on the large premium it offered to the share price, have little to complain about. Potentially more troublesome are the approvals that may be required in the various countries where Addax operates, and protests from human-rights activists, who have targeted Chinese firms working in Sudan and other unstable places.

Many of Addax’s projects are controversial. Some of its drilling rights in Nigeria, for example, are in dispute. Its contracts in Iraq are with the government of the autonomous Kurdish area, and have been denounced by the oil minister in Baghdad. So the takeover may complicate Sinopec’s efforts to win access to oil elsewhere in Iraq. The only certainty is that the deal will not quench the thirst of Sinopec and its fellow state-controlled oil firms, PetroChina and CNOOC, for foreign oil, whatever the risks.

The Economist

Otro latinazgo al paso

Alea iacta est o alea jacta est es una locución latina de uso actual que significa "se echó el dado", "el dado fue echado" o "la suerte está echada". Es una expresión atribuida por Suetonio a Julio César en el momento de cruzar el río Rubicón, límite entre Italia y la Galia Cisalpina (provincia que el Senado romano le había asignado). Con este paso, se rebeló contra la autoridad del Senado y dio comienzo a la larga guerra civil contra Pompeyo y los Optimates. Según algunas versiones, César usó el imperativo “jaci” en lugar del pasivo “jacta est” (“¡Echad la suerte!”).

En realidad, parece ser, si se cree a Plutarco, que la frase fue dicha en griego, tomándola de un verso del comediógrafo Menandro, con el sentido de "los dados están echados (esperemos ahora la suerte)". El escritor era al parecer uno de los favoritos de César.
Seguramente, la fuente que usó Plutarco para decir esto, sería el Prólogo del libro de Historias de Asinio Polión, partidario del bando cesariano, que comentó la anécdota, puesto que, por su cercanía a César, tal vez lo hubiera escuchado en el momento de cruzar el Rubicón. Es posible que Horacio oyera esto al propio Asinio Polión en la "recitatio" (término latino que se refiere a una especie de presentaciones de libros en sociedad, cuya forma final en época de Augusto se debe a Polión en persona) de su obra.
La frase en griego (ανερριφθω κυβος) está, pues, en Menandro 65.4 y Plutarco Caes. 32 . En latín, tal vez la traducción más rigurosa sería: "jacta esto alea" y podríamos traducirla como "que se lance el dado" "que esté el dado lanzado" con el sentido que arriba se ha comentado.

La oración implica que él había tomado el riesgo y pasado un “punto de no retorno”, es decir, él no podía retroceder de lo que había hecho, como el jugador que ha apostado todo a una tirada de dados. Hoy en día, la frase significa dar un paso irrevocable, generalmente de riesgo o confrontación.

Gramaticalmente, está formada por el nominativo de alea, -ae (suerte) y el pretérito perfecto pasado de iacio (lanzar, echar).

Autorictas, Dignitas y Tinelli

Auctoritas

En la Roma antigua, Auctoritas se refirio al nivel de prestigio general de una persona dentro de la sociedad romana, su influencia y su capacidad de congregar apoyo para su voluntad.

Dicho de otra forma, es la capacidad de hacer que la gente haga lo que vos queres, solo por quien sos

Dignitas

Dignitas en la Roma antigua fue definida como la suma de fuerza personal e influencia que un ciudadano adquiere a traves de su vida. Cuando se media la dignitas personal de un individuo, se tomaban en cuenta factores como la reputacion personal, su moral, y su etica, junto con el derecho al respeto y tratamiento correcto.

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Voto Electronico

Cada tanto aparece el voto electronico como la panacea, el antifraude por excelencia, quizas caben dos comentarios
1. Lo que importas no es el voto sino quien lo cuenta, y, aca entraria la maquina perfecta
2. No debe haber nada mas controlado, en teoria, que los cajeros electronicos, al fin y al cabo, es la viscera mas sensible

y aca, una pequeña nota, me dio fiaca traducirla

solo el titulo y el primer parrafo

Troyanos que leen datos escondidos en Cajeros Automaticos del Este de Europa

Expertos de seguridad han descubierto una familia de troyanos que roban datos que se han escondido dentro de Cajeros Automaticos en el Este de Europa los ultimos 18 meses

sigan divirtiendose

Data-sniffing trojans burrow into Eastern European ATMs


Security experts have discovered a family of data-stealing trojans that have burrowed into automatic teller machines in Eastern Europe over the past 18 months.

The malware logs the magnetic-stripe data and personal identification number of cards used at an infected machine and provides an intuitive interface for retrieving the information using the ATM's receipt printer, according to analysts from SpiderLabs, the research arm of security firm Trustwave. Since late 2007 or so, there have been at least 16 updates to the software, an indication that the authors are working hard to perfect their tool.


"They're following more of a rapid development lifecycle," Nicholas Percoco, vice president and head of SpiderLabs, told The Register. "They're seeing what works and putting out new versions."

SpiderLabs researchers delved into four of the more recent versions and what they found was a highly capable family malware written with professional standards. Once installed, it monitors the ATM's transaction message queue for track 2 data stored on inserted cards. If it contains data belonging to a banking customer, it logs it, along with the PIN code that was entered.

The software also works with controller cards that allow the attackers to operate infected machines. When such a card is inserted, the ATM's display shows a window offering 10 command options that can be selected using the keypad. Options include the ability to print collected data, restore log files to the condition prior to the malware installation, and uninstall the malware altogether.

A secondary menu also allows the person to force the machine to dispense all its cash. There is also documentation for another feature that would upload intercepted card data to a chip on the controller card, but that capability doesn't seem to work yet. Controller cards include both master and single function. The former is presumably for people higher up in the organization while the latter would be used by mules who are not fully trusted.

The findings build on a report issued in March by Sophos that documented card-sniffing trojans that targeted ATMs made by Diebold. The ATM manufacturer said several suspects had been apprehended following an incident "isolated in Russia" in which attempts were made to use the malware.

SpiderLabs' Percoco said he didn't know if the malware his researchers studied was tied to the Sophos report. Both malicious programs can be installed only by people with physical access to the machines, making some level of insider cooperation necessary. But unlike the Sophos report, SpiderLabs said the software targeted ATMs made by multiple vendors, though Percoco declined to say which ones. The SpiderLabs report said only that the targeted ATMs ran on the Windows XP operating system.

"These are systems that are connected to financial networks that are literally sitting out in the open, and they are vulnerable," Percoco said. "All these systems are unattended, or most of them are. You often walk by when they're being serviced."